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International Litigation Trends in Environmental Liability
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION TRENDS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY:




Environmental claims1 are not new in international litigation.2 However, they 
have recently appeared with renewed strength in the front pages of  well-known 
newspapers. Cases like Trafi gura – before the UK and Dutch courts – and 
Aguinda – before US and Ecuador Courts – can serve as examples. Trafi gura 
deals with the unloading of  a waste shipment at the Ivory Coast on 19 August 
2006. The transporting ship (Probo Koala), chartered by the London offi ce of  
Trafi gura – a Dutch international petroleum trader – had attempted to discharge 
this waste at the port of  Amsterdam, but the port service did not authorise the 
operation because of  its alleged toxicity. Following the unloading in the Ivory 
Coast, fatalities occurred and some people sought medical attention allegedly 
from exposure to the waste.3 In Aguinda, a group of  indigenous people alleged 
that the oil operations conducted by fi rst Texaco, and from 2001, its successor, 
* Dr Carmen Otero García-Castrillón, Profesora Titular de Derecho internacional privado, 
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1 There is no international defi nitive defi nition of  environment but Principle 2 of  the Decla-
ration of  the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 15–16 June, 1972 
(www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503), refers 
to the “natural resources of  the earth, including the air, water, land, fl ora and fauna and espe-
cially representative samples of  natural ecosystems”. Recital 1 of  the Preamble makes clear that 
this environment should be distinguished from the man-made environment (living and working 
conditions). See P Sands, Principles of  International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2nd edn, 2003), 16.
2 International litigation is understood as litigation involving an international element, be it the 
place of  harm or the residence/domicile of  the authors or victims of  the damage.
3 A civil claim was presented by about 30,000 plaintiffs before the High Court in London in 
November 2006 and in September 2009 parties reached a settlement (High Court of  Justice 
[2009] EWHC 1246 (QB), 18 May 2009). L Enneking, “The Common Denominator of  the 
Trafi gura Case, Foreign Direct Liability Cases and the Rome II Regulation” (2008) 16 European 
Review of  Private Law 283, 311. Moreover, in February 2008, Dutch prosecutors fi led criminal 
charges against Trafi gura (and against one of  its employees and the captain of  the Probo Koala) 
on the illegal exporting of  hazardous waste. In July 2010 the Court ruled that the company 
had concealed the dangerous nature of  the waste and fi ned it €1 million.
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Chevron, polluted the rainforests and rivers in the Oriente region in Ecuador 
resulting in environmental damage as well as in increased rates of  cancer and 
other serious health problems for the local population.4
It is possible to acknowledge that, whilst international environmental dam-
ages often – but, of  course, not always5 – arise in developing countries, it is by 
no means unusual6 that litigation takes place in the US and the EU Member 
States’ jurisdictions to overcome the handicaps of  the legal systems in those 
developing countries.7 Hence, ascertaining which courts have jurisdiction and 
in those courts what the applicable law would be are essential steps that should 
be taken before deciding where to litigate. Moreover, even when litigation takes 
place in the affected developing country, judgments awarding damages may 
have to be recognised and enforced in developed countries where the defend-
ant’s assets are to be found.8 It is not surprising that the length of  litigation 
and the uncertainties and costs associated with it – for companies, economic 
as much as reputational – favours the settlement of  these cases through agree-
ments.
4 After the acceptance of  a forum non conveniens motion (see infra on forum non conveniens motion), 
the case Aguinda v Texaco was not pleaded before US courts: Aguinda v Texaco, 142 FSupp 2d 
534 (SDNY 2001); 303 F3d 470 (2nd Cir 2002) – but before Ecuadorian courts (Maria Aguinda 
v Chevron, 2002–03).
5 It is possible to refer to two recent cases of  sea oil pollution, where civil actions were resolved 
by criminal courts (see infra jurisdiction). The Erica case, fi nally resolved by the Cour d’Appel de 
Paris on 30 March 2010 (see infra n 20), and the Prestige case, which is in the oral procedural 
phase before the Spanish Courts (see infra n 40).
6 Of  course, it is not always the case. As an example, on 25 March 2011, an environmental claim 
was presented in a Court in Libreville (Gabon) on behalf  of  a group of  inhabitants against la 
Compagnie miriére de l’Ogooué (COMILOG), belonging to the French group ERAMET.
7 This is also the case with human rights related torts. See M Requejo Isidro, Violaciones graves 
de derechos humanos y responsabilidad civil (Transnational Human Rights Claims) (Thomson-Aranzadi, 
2009), 19–26.
8 Shortly before the process in Ecuador (see supra n 4) was going to conclude (as it did the 14 
February 2011, now – July 2011 – under appeal), Chevron (succeeding Texaco) obtained from 
the US courts a temporary order (antisuit injunction) restraining the recognition of  any judg-
ment against it obtained in Ecuador (Case 1:11-cv-00691-LAK Document 181; 7/3/2011). The 
judge (Kaplan) recognising that this was an “unusual order” – it was adopted 8 February, before 
the sentence was given in Ecuador, and extended until 8 March – founded his decision on the 
fact that the “plaintiffs’ announced strategy to cause as much disruption as possible” and on 
that they were trying to force a settlement (in the appellate procedure now in course, two amicus 
curiae briefs have been presented to defend both the Ecuadorian appellant and the Chevron 
positions). In this regard, it has to be acknowledged that Chevron initiated an arbitration pro-
cedure against Ecuador before the Permanent Court of  Arbitration alleging a violation of  the 
US–Ecuador bilateral investment treaty by unduly infl uencing the judiciary and compromising 
its independence. On 9 February 2011 the Court adopted interim measures ordering Ecuador 
to “take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement or 
recognition within and without Ecuador of  any judgment” (PCA Case No 2009-23), www.chev-
ron.com/documents/pdf/ecuador/TribunalInterimMeasuresOrder.pdf. On the non-recognition 
issue see LJ Dhoog, “Aguinda v Chevrontexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-Recogni-
tion of  Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United States” (2010) 28 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 241.
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This paper aims at refl ecting on the trends in this type of  international litiga-
tion from the private international law perspective. For this purpose, jurisdiction 
and confl ict-of-laws problems will be analysed, looking at recent cases from a 
comparative point of  view, particularly considering the US and EU Member 
States’ jurisdictions. Reference will be made to the basis of  international envi-
ronmental wrongdoings and to the actors and actions. Then, reference will be 
made to the international legal sources in the fi eld, to continue with the issues 
of  jurisdiction and applicable law in the US and the EU before fi nishing off  
by offering some conclusions.
B. LITIGATION LANDSCAPE
Damages to the environment are usually associated with human rights.9 
Whether environmental damages entail a violation of  human rights is a dif-
ferent issue, the response to which depends on the particular case and the 
jurisdiction involved.10 What is clear is that there is regulation, international 
and national, aiming at the protection of  the environment which can be said 
to have mostly an administrative character – obtaining licenses or permits for 
implementing activities – as well as for the sanctioning of  the behaviour that 
does not comply with it or causes damages – administrative, criminal and civ-
il.11 In the civil arena, the prosecution of  this behaviour may comprise claims, 
beyond the deterrence/cease and desist orders, for indemnifi cation of  dam-
ages. These claims are based on the existence of  behaviour that allegedly does 
not satisfy certain environmental standards of  care – mostly imposed through 
administrative and criminal rules.
The damage that is being considered is twofold. On the one hand, there is 
damage caused to the environment itself  and, as a consequence, to the people 
9 In 1994, an international group of  experts on human rights and environmental protection 
convened at the United Nations in Geneva and drafted the text that was incorporated in the 
UN Economic and Social Council document on the Review of  Further Developments in Fields with 
which the Sub-Commission has been concerned Human Rights and the Environment (E/CN4/Sub2/1994/9, 
Annex I (1994)). The Draft Declaration describes the environmental dimension of  established 
human rights, such as the rights to life, health and culture. It also describes the procedural 
rights, such as the right to participation, necessary for realisation of  the substantive rights, and 
describes duties that correspond to the rights – duties that apply to individuals, governments, 
international organisations and transnational corporations.
10 To illustrate the view of  the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR), see the case Ostra v 
Spain Judgment of  9 December 1994, Case No 41/1993/436/515, where the court established 
the violation of  the respect for the claimants’ right to their private lives (Art 8 of  the Conven-
tion) caused by the establishment of  a waste treatment facility very close to their home – due 
to the state’s failure in maintaining an “adequate balance” between this right and the munici-
pality’s economic and social interests (paras 51 and 58).
11 The diffi culties for internally determining the applicable rules is illustrated in the Spanish case 
in C Gómez Ligüerre, “Problemas de jurisdicción competente y de derecho applicable en 
 pleitos de responsabilidad civil extracontractual”, InDret, May 2/2009 (www.indret.com).
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living in it since it is its deterioration that affects people – pure environmen-
tal damage. On the other hand, indirectly, individuals, groups and associations 
may suffer personal and patrimonial harms (pluri-individual).12 This last type 
of  harm – which, nevertheless, would have to be judged in accordance with 
the corresponding applicable law13 – is the one involved in civil environmental 
claims.14 These claims become international when the harm is caused and/or 
suffered in two or more countries, which usually entails the diverse residence – 
and even nationality – of  the actors. In any case, beyond the possibility of  
resorting to alternative dispute-settlement mechanisms,15 these claims are to be 
presented before national courts.
1. Actors and Actions
It is easy to infer that plaintiffs in these actions will most often be natural 
persons acting for themselves or through the representation of  groups or asso-
ciations of  prejudiced people. Although the entitlement to claim is governed by 
the lex causae, the legitimacy of  certain associations to act before the courts of  a 
state would depend on the law of  the forum.16 The defendants will most often 
12 M Bogdan, “Some Refl ections Regarding Environmental Damage and the Rome II Regula-
tion” in G Venturini and S Bariatti (eds), New Instruments of  Private International Law (Giuffre, 
2009), 99–100; A Crespo Hernández, La responsabilidad civil derivada de la contaminación transfronter-
iza ante la jurisdicción estata (Eurolex, 1999), 47–48.
13 For example, the European Principles of  Tort Law (EPTL), prepared by the European Group 
on Tort Law, www.egtl.org, refer to “recoverable damage” and defi ne it as the material or imma-
terial harm to a legally protected interest (Art 2:101). However, not every legally protected interest 
– which would have to be determined according to a law – will have the same scope of  protec-
tion. In this regard interests are “classifi ed” according to their nature “the higher its value, the 
precision of  its defi nition and its obviousness, the more extensive is its protection”; the nature 
of  the liability (intentional or not) together with the interests of  the actor and general public 
interests (Art 2:102(1), (5) and (6)). The rights to life, bodily or mental integrity, human dignity 
and liberty enjoy the most extensive protection. Extensive protection is granted to property 
rights, including those in intangible property. Protection of  pure economic interests or contrac-
tual relationships may be more limited in scope (Art 2:102(3), (4) and (5)). In such cases, due 
regard must be had especially to the proximity between the actor and the endangered person, 
or to the fact that the actor is aware of  the fact that he will cause damage even though his 
interests are necessarily valued lower than those of  the victim.
14 As to the characterisation issues that may appear on the nature of  compensation claims pre-
sented by public authorities in the EU, the ECJ interpretation of  the civil and commercial 
character of  claims in the Brussels I Regulation (Case C-271/00 Baten [2002] ECR I-10489) 
and the text of  the Rome II Regulation (that excludes from its scope public acta iure imperii – 
see infra) lead to them being considered of  a civil nature. The Rome II exclusion is said to 
have a “narrative” character. FJ Garcimartín Alférez, “The Rome II Regulation: On the Way 
Towards a European Private International Law Code” (2007) 7 European Legal Forum 80.
15 Arbitration or mediation offered by, for example, the OECD National Contact Points for the 
implementation of  the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises recommendations. The 
decisions adopted are, however, not binding and do not establish compensation to the vic-
tims.
16 The entitlement to claim for compensation is governed by the lex causae (as to the EU, see infra 
n 77), but class or collective actions will only be admitted before national courts if  the forum 
procedural laws authorise these kind of  actions. In this regard, it has to be acknowledged that 
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be legal persons, especially multinational corporations or groups that, despite 
acting legally in an independent way, belong to the same economic group which 
have their headquarters in a developed country. For reasons that comprise, at 
least, marketing and economic interests, these companies are increasingly con-
cerned with their corporate social responsibility results and these clearly include 
their environmental achievements.
The civil environmental claim usually pursues the deterrence of  the harmful 
behaviour and restoration of  the environmental damage and, no less impor-
tantly, compensation for the personal and economic damage caused by the 
environmental harm. To achieve these purposes, choosing the appropriate juris-
diction – and thereby determining the applicable law – becomes a defi nitive 
factor.
2. International Legal Sources
Beyond the human rights treaties and customary law recognising environmen-
tally related rights, there are a number of  international treaties dealing with civil 
liability for environmental harm,17 comprising the personal and the patrimo-
nial damages.18 These are treaties per sector, referring to specifi c environmental 
hazards – mostly oil and nuclear related, which, despite their differences, aim 
there are very different approaches to collective actions (even within the EU, where the Com-
mission launched in February 2011 a public consultation attempting to identify common legal 
principles that should underpin collective actions across the EU, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/132&format=HTML&ge). For a comparative study see L 
Carballo Piñero, Las acciones colectivas y su efi cacia extraterritorial. Problemas de recepción y transplante de 
las class actions en Europa (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 2009).
 
17 Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of  Nuclear Energy (Paris, 1960) supplemented 
by Brussels Convention (1963) and Harmonized with the Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage (Vienna, 1963 – in force since 1977 and amended in 1997); Convention on 
Civil Liability in the fi eld of  Maritime Carriage of  Nuclear Material (Brussels, 1971, in force 
since 1975); Convention on the Limitation of  Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC, London, 
1976, amended in 1996 – in force since 1986 and 2004); International Convention on the 
Limitation of  the Liability of  Owners of  Sea-going Ships (Brussels, 1957 and 1979 Protocol 
–in force since 1968 and 1984); International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (CLC, Brussels, 1969, with London, 1976 and 1992 Protocols, amended in 2000 – in 
force since 1975); Convention on Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (London, 2001 
– in force since 2008); Protocol on Liability and compensation for damage resulting from 
Transboundary Movements of  Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basle Protocol, 1989 – 
in force since 1992 – amended in 1999 and 2010 – not in force); International Convention 
on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of  Harzardous 
and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS, London, 1996 – not in force – Protocol 2010); Proto-
col on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of  
Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and 
Use of  Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on 
the Transboundary Effects of  Industrial Accidents (Kiev Protocol, 2003 – not in force); Con-
vention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment 
(Lugano, 1993 – not in force).
18 Arts 1.1.k Vienna; 2 Brussels 1971; 2 LLMC; 1 Brussels 1979; 1.6 CLC; 1.9 London; 2.2.c 
Basle Protocol; 1.6 HNS; 2.2.d Kiev Protocol, 2.7 Lugano.
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particularly at establishing an objective and limited civil liability system when 
the accident, and mostly, the damage, takes place in the territory (including 
waters within the jurisdiction of  the adjacent state) of  the contracting par-
ties.19
In order to achieve their purpose, beyond the determination of  the respon-
sible subjects,20 the imposition of  compulsory insurance and the creation of  
funds that will respond in case of  damages, some of  these conventions include 
jurisdiction21 – even, occasionally, lis pendens and related actions rules22 – and 
recognition and enforcement norms.23 It is, however, more exceptional that 
they include confl ict-of-laws rules. When they exist, they refer to the lex fori 
“including confl ict of  laws”,24 and, when non-existent, the treaties have often 
been interpreted in the sense that, once jurisdiction is established in accord-
19 Arts 1A Vienna; 15 LLMC and 7 Brussels 1979 (actions before state parties courts), II CLC 
(damage caused by parties); 2 London (pollution caused by parties); 3 Basle Protocol (damage 
suffered or transport originating in a party); 3 HNS (damage caused in the territory –includ-
ing ships registered or under a party’s fl ag); 3 Kiev Protocol (damage suffered in a state party 
– including territorial sea and exclusive economic zone), 3 Lugano (incident in the territory 
of  Member State and indirect application through confl ict-of-laws rules). On the geographical 
scope of  the maritime civil liability conventions, see J. Basedow, “Rome II at Sea – General 
Aspects of  Maritime Torts” (2010) 74 RabelsZ Bd 129.
20 Arts 4 and 6 of  Basle refer to persons in control of  the waste. Arts 1 Brussels 1971, 2 Vienna 
and 4 Kiev refer to the operator (as defi ned in each instrument). Under Art 1 LLMC ship 
owners and salvors (as defi ned in the Article) are responsible. Under Arts 3 London and 7 
and 8 HSN, the person directly responsible is the owner of  the boat. The rule is the same in 
Art. III.4 CLC. However, as the French Cour d’Appel de Paris decided in the Erika case (pôle 
4 chambre 11E no RG 08/02278, arrêt rendue le 30 March 2010) after the ECJ interpreted 
the CLC and the EU Directive 96/350 on waste, the responsibility lies not only with the ship 
owner and the handler, but also with the ship charterer (Total). The ECJ (C-188/07, Commune 
de Mesquer v Total France and Total International [2008] ECR I-4501) established (paras 78 and 82) 
that persons other than the ship owner (seller of  the hydrocarbons and charterer of  the ship) 
could be considered producers of  waste and that, if  the harm they caused was not covered by 
the CLC Fund, “or cannot be borne because the ceiling for compensation for that accident 
has been reached, and that, in accordance with the limitations and/or exemptions of  liability 
laid down, the national law of  a Member State, including the law derived from international 
agreements, prevents that cost from being borne by the ship owner and/or the charterer . . . 
such a national law will then, . . . have to make provision for that cost to be borne by the pro-
ducer of  the product from which the waste thus spread came”.
21 Arts XI Vienna (where the accident occurs; if  not a contracting party or not identifi able, where 
the operator’s installation is); IX CLC, 9 London (cause or preventive measures); 17 Basle Pro-
tocol (cause, consequence or defendant’s residence or principal place of  business); 38 HNS 
(cause, preventive measures, fl ag or registry of  the ship, owners habitual residence or prin-
cipal place of  business and where the fund is constituted); 13 Kiev Protocol (cause, harm or 
defendant´s domicile – arbitration is also contemplated in Art 18), 19 Lugano (cause, harm or 
defendant´s domicile).
22 Arts 1 Vienna; 15 LLMC; 7 Brussels 1979; 2 London; 3 Basel Protocol; 3 HNS; 18 Kiev Pro-
tocol, 20–21 Lugano.
23 Arts X CLC, 21 Basle Protocol; 18 Kiev Protocol, 23 Lugano.
24 Art I.1.e Vienna (lex fori “including any rules of  such law relating to confl ict of  laws”), Art 19 
Basle Protocol (lex fori including confl ict of  laws) and Art 16 Kiev Protocol – not in force  – (lex 
fori including confl ict of  laws or victim’s choice of  the law of  the place of  damage or of  the 
place of  the event giving rise to the cause of  action), whose Art 20 also establishes the prevail-
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ance with the agreement, the lex fori applies anyway.25 It is interesting to note 
that the Hague Conference on Private International Law, after years of  having 
the environment on the agenda with a comprehensive private international law 
analysis,26 considered focusing on the possibility of  working on a soft law instru-
ment – without discarding the possibility of  an international treaty – on confl ict 
of  laws, but in the end decided to drop the matter from its agenda.27
The web of  environmentally related treaties outlined above, to which some 
general private international law conventions28 and institutional European 
norms29 have to be added, may cause problems in determining the applicable 
rule. For that purpose, beyond the Vienna Convention succession of  treaties 
norms, compatibility rules exist in some of  these instruments.30
It is worthwhile noting that, whilst a signifi cant number of  EU Member 
States – and even the EU itself  – participate in these agreements31 – the Euro-
pean Court of  Justice (ECJ) has also been called to rule on the self-executing 
character of  certain convention provisions dealing with environmentally related 
rights of  private subjects32 – the US is not a party to any of  them. Hence, the 
ing application of  EU confl ict-of-laws rules. Art 14 LLCM contains a confl ict-of-laws rule but 
only for fund constitution and distribution (lex fori).
 
25 This is, at least, the case for the nuclear conventions (Art 14b Paris, 1960). M Fallon, B 
Fauvarque-Cosson and S Franq, “Le régime du risque transfrontére de la responsabilité environ-
nementale: en marche vers un droit spécial des confl its de lois?” in G Viney and B Dubuisson 
(eds), Les reponsabilités environnementales dans l’espace européen (Bruylant, 2005), 547–72.
26 Prel Doc 8 May 2000. Civil Liability Resulting from Transfrontier Environmental Damage: A Case for 
the Hague Conference? Note drawn up by C Bernasconi (www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd8e.
pdf). See the analysis of  P Beaumont, “Private International Law of  the Environment” [1995] 
Juridical Review 28. A reference to its prospective objective is offered by K Fach Gómez, La con-
taminación transfronteriza en Derecho internacional privado (Bosch, 2002), 85–90.
27 Prel Doc 12, for the attention of  the Council of  April 2010 on General Affairs and Policy of  
the Conference, February 2010, “Should The Hague Conference Revisit the Scope and Nature 
of  Possible Work in the Field of  Civil Liability for Environmental Damage?”, 4–6. In April 
2010, the Council decided to delete from the Agenda the topic dealing with the confl ict of  
jurisdictions, applicable law and international judicial and administrative co-operation in respect 
of  civil liability for environmental damage: see www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010concl_e.
pdf, p 4.
28 For example, the Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of  
judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2009] OJ L147 and the Choice of  Court Conven-
tion concluded on 30 June 2005 (not in force). http://www.hcch.net.
29 See infra.
30 Arts XVIII (does not affect the application of  other international agreements); 4 HNS (CLC 
prevails); 21 Basle Protocol (favor recognitionis); 20 Kiev (EU jurisdiction and applicable laws pre-
vail); 24 Lugano (jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement agreements between parties 
prevail).
31 See Appendix.
32 Case C-240/09 Lesoochanárske zoskupenie VKL v Ministerstwo zivotného prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 
judgment of  the Grand Chamber of  8 March 2011, declares the non-directly effective char-
acter of  Art 9.3 of  the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on 25 June 1998, 
due to the need for national legislative implementation (para 45) but the Slovakian court had, 
“in order to ensure effective judicial protection in the fi elds covered by EU environmental law, 
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US is not subject to the jurisdiction and applicable law rules or the objective 
limited liability system. For plaintiffs this factor may play in favour of  litigat-
ing in US courts.
C. JURISDICTION
Different states may recognise the jurisdictional competence of  their courts to 
hear environmental civil claims on the basis of  the criteria established in their 
national laws or international instruments. In order to present the possibilities 
of  resorting to the courts of  EU Member States or the US and to analyse the 
jurisdictional trends in international environmental litigation, both systems are 
referred to in the following paragraphs. It is interesting to note that many judi-
cial proceedings end up with settlements – in the EU33 than in the US34 – to 
avoid litigation costs as much as, from the corporations’ perspective, the nega-
tive impact of  publicity. In this regard it is not surprising that corporations 
insert a statement expressing that the settlement agreement in no way implies 
their acceptance of  liability.
1. European Union
In the EU, the Brussels I Regulation35 – mainly applicable, for the time being,36 
when the defendant is domiciled in a Member State (Article 2) – establishes 
to interpret its national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is consistent with the 
objectives laid down in Art 9(3) of  the Aarhus Convention” (para 50).
 
33 In July 2005 a group of  Colombian farmers instituted proceedings in the English High Court 
against BP Exploration Company (Colombia) alleging that the construction of  an oil pipeline 
by OCENSA (a consortium led by BP) had caused severe environmental damage to their lands. 
Among other arguments, BP alleged that the suit should be in Colombia (see infra forum non con-
veniens). In June 2006 BP and the farmers met for mediation in Bogotá and in July the parties 
announced that a settlement had been reached. The parties did not disclose the terms and the 
amounts paid. However, they did announce that BP, without admitting liability, had agreed to 
establish an Environmental and Social Improvement Trust Fund for the benefi t of  the farmers, 
together with a programme of  workshops dealing with environmental management and busi-
ness development. According to press reports, the amount paid by BP was not thought to be as 
high as the £15 million originally claimed, but was believed to run to several million pounds.
34 Wiwa v Shell, 8 June 2009. This is not a direct environmental case, but concerns the human 
rights violation of  environmental activists of  the Ogoni region in the Niger delta. It was set-
tled for US$15.5 million after 13 years of  litigation.
35 Regulation 44/2001 of  22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of  judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L12, applicable in all EU Member 
States, including Denmark, [2005] OJ L299 (from July 2007).
36 Art 4.2 of  the Recast Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of  judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters, COM(2010) 748 fi nal, would extend its application to persons not domiciled 
in any Member State. However, the Draft Report of  the European Parliament on the Proposal 
(2010/0383-COD, pp 7, 8, 13 and 47), 28 June 2011, argues against this extension of  jurisdic-
tion as it “requires wide-ranging consultation and political debate”.
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the precedence of  the international conventions on particular matters in which 
Member States are parties (Article 71).37 A number of  these conventions include 
jurisdiction rules that, therefore, will apply when the incident/harm takes place 
in the territory of  a state that is party to such a Convention. Not surprisingly, 
these rules often coincide with one of  the fora offered by the Regulation (Arti-
cle 5.3) but, in any case, it is clear that the Regulation has to be set aside as a 
legal basis for establishing jurisdiction.
When the international agreements are not applicable, Brussels I allows for 
a number of  fora.38 Firstly, the one chosen by the parties (prorogation of  juris-
diction) expressly (Article 23; where it is enough for the court chosen to be in 
a Member State regardless of  where the parties are domiciled) or impliedly by 
entering appearance without contesting the jurisdiction (Article 24). Secondly, 
the defendant´s domicile (Article 2). This forum is especially relevant when 
damages are suffered in the territory of  non-Member States whose judicial 
procedures and/or remedies are non-existent or inadequate. The Regulation 
provides for a fl exible concept of  a corporation`s domicile (Article 60)39 and 
the lifting-of-the-veil principle permits acting against the headquarters of  a 
group of  companies.40 In cases of  multiple defendants, the domicile of  any of  
them can be used to establish jurisdiction as long as the claims are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid 
the risk of  irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings (Arti-
cle 6.1). Thirdly, the competent criminal court forum is available in so far as 
national law accords civil competence too (Article 5.4), as is the case, for exam-
ple, in Spain and France. Despite the preference of  civil liability conventions 
37 On this issue, see M Fallon, “La relación del Reglamento ‘Roma II’ con otras normas de con-
fl icto de leyes”, (2007) VII Anuario español de Derecho Internacional Privado 216–17.
38  These fora are only partially coincident with Rule 4 of  the International Law Association 
(ILA) Resolution on Transnational Enforcement of  Environmental Law, adopted in Toronto 
6/2006 (www.ila-hq.org/download.../794784AC-08FE-4DA9-A02948C51E5C4E0E), which, in 
this regard, is based on the 2001 Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters submitted to The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law as well as in environmentally related international civil liability treaties. ILA 
rules are established for any civil action allowing the plaintiff  to choose between the defendant’s 
domicile/residence; the place of  the cause or the place of  the harm. However, ILA rules do 
not provide for the civil jurisdiction of  a competent criminal court, nor do they allow parties 
to enter into a jurisdiction agreement. The ILA Committee supported opting for mandatory 
jurisdiction in environmental disputes as this approach refl ected the need for the certainty and 
predictability that facilitates the speedy resolution of  this kind of  dispute.
39 Legal persons are domiciled where they have their statutory seat, central administration 
or principal place of  business. For an analysis, see P Vlas, “Article 60”, in U Magnus and 
P Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation (Sellier, 2007), 701–05.
40 At least in the competition fi eld, according to the ECJ: “[T]he conduct of  a subsidiary may 
be attributed to the parent company in particular where, although having a separate legal per-
sonality, that subsidiary does not determine independently its own conduct on the market, but 
essentially carries out the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard espe-
cially to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal entities” (Case 
C-97/08 Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237 (para 58)).
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over national law regarding the establishment of  civil jurisdiction, it is possible 
to observe that criminal courts tend not to mention the convention’s jurisdiction 
criterion when resolving the civil claims.41 There is, however, no material viola-
tion of  these treaties because their jurisdiction criteria coincides with the most 
commonly used criminal forum, ie the locus damni. Finally, the locus delicti forum 
(Article 5.3), as interpreted by the ECJ in the Bier case,42 allows the plaintiff  to 
choose to bring the case in the courts of  the place where the direct43 damage 
occurred (locus damni) or in the courts of  the place where the event giving rise 
to the damage occurred (locus causae).44
Moreover, it cannot be discounted that, when the environmental action is 
related to another relationship between the parties – eg a contract – jurisdic-
tion could be established in favour of  the competent court for this related 
action (Article 28). In addition, the Proposal for the Recast of  the Brussels I 
Regulation reform opens the door for an exceptional forum necessitatis for cases 
where none of  the already-mentioned jurisdiction criteria lead to establishing 
the competence of  a Member State court and there is a risk of  leaving plain-
tiffs deprived of  their – human and fundamental – right of  access to justice 
(Article 26).45
It is important to note that it is the fi rst claimant who chooses – except in 
the case of  jurisdiction agreements – in which court he presents the action. 
Once it is done – and if  it has been done conforming to the forum proce-
dural law – there is no possibility that this court would decline its competence. 
The ECJ has ruled that the forum non conveniens motion to dismiss cannot be 
41 In the Erika case, see supra nn 5 and 19, French courts sentenced the criminal and civil claims. 
In Spain the Prestige case is litigated before criminal courts and civil claims are included (proc-
ess no 960/2002, before the fi rst instance and instruction court of  Corcubión). It is interesting 
to note that, with the intervention of  Eurojust and, resorting to the European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Strasburg, 1959; Art 21), France relinquished its crimi-
nal and civil actions in favour of  Spanish public action (Ministerio Fiscal); N/Ref  ST 935/05, 
Eurojust Caso no 27/FR/03.
42 Case 21/76 Bier v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace [1976] ECR 1735.
43 Indirect damage cannot form the basis for jurisdiction as “the term ‘place where the harm-
ful event occurred’ cannot be construed so extensively as to encompass any place where the 
adverse consequences can be felt of  an event which has already caused damage actually arising 
elsewhere” (Case C-364/93 Marinari [1995] ECR I-2719, para 14). For an analysis of  the place 
where pure economic loss occurs, see M Lehmann, “Where Does Economic Loss Occur?” 
(2011) 7 Journal of  Private International Law 527 [this issue].
44 The Report on the application of  Brussels I demonstrated that the current situation under Art 
5(3) is acceptable although there might be some problems to be resolved: see B Hess, T Pfeiffer 
and P Schlosser, Report on the Application of  Regulation Brussels I in the Member States (Beck, 2008), 
56–59.
45 See supra n 36, Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of  judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters. See also Requejo Isidro, supra n 7, 205–08. However, the Draft Report of  the European 
Parliament on the Proposal (2010/0383-COD, pp 20 and 47), 28 June 2011, argues in favour 
of  deleting Art 26, stating that this way of  extending jurisdiction “requires wide-ranging con-
sultation and political debate”.
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accepted, be it in intra-EU or extra-EU cases.46 Before this ruling, in the UK 
it was possible to see parties resorting to this motion and courts accepting it in 
environmental litigation.47
It can be concluded that the conventions and the EU approaches to estab-
lishing jurisdiction look at the nexus between the dispute and the forum which, 
in any case, preserves the right to justice. In the future, Brussels I may depart 
a bit from that nexus to permit, in extreme cases, the main focus on the right 
to justice.
2. United States of  America
On the US side, the focus of  the jurisdiction to adjudicate is on the nexus 
between the defendant and the forum. Beyond international agreements, 
the US system to establish international civil jurisdiction requires consider-
ing personal (general) and material (specifi c or subject matter) jurisdiction. As 
to personal jurisdiction, domicile, service of  process, etc, the criteria are well 
established48 and the lifting-of-the-veil theory is also accepted in cases of  multi-
national corporations.49 However, the determination of  the material jurisdic-
46 Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383.
47 Two relatively recent cases can be mentioned. The Cape lawsuits were fi nally resolved in 2003 
through settlements after fi ve years of  litigation were spent in resolving the forum non conveniens 
motion. The litigation involved two group actions. In the fi rst group case, the English Court 
of  Appeal reversed in 1998 a lower court decision and decided to reject the motion, therefore, 
accepting jurisdiction. In the second group, the Court of  Appeal affi rmed, in 1999, the lower 
court decision accepting the motion. The appeal to the House of  Lords fi nally led, in 2000, 
see Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545, to rejection of  the motion and the case continued 
before the English courts. In the Colombian farmers’ case against BP – see supra n 31 – the 
motion was presented before the English High Court. However, it did not have to be resolved 
since, in 2006 and through mediation, the parties reached a settlement. On forum non conveniens 
in the UK, see P Beaumont and P McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law (SULI/W Green, 
3rd edn, 2011), 359–67.
48 The distinction between personal (general) and material (specifi c) jurisdiction was formally rec-
ognized by the US Supreme Court from Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia SA v Hall 466 US 
408 (1984). From International Shoe Co v Washington 326 US 310 (1945), the personal jurisdiction 
test requires “minimum contacts plus reasonableness”. Based on the due process clause of  the 
14th Amendment of  the US Constitution as modelled by the Supreme Court jurisprudence, to 
determine personal jurisdiction some states’ long-arm statutes expressly establish tort jurisdic-
tion when a tortious injury is caused in the state by an act or omission outside the state if  the 
author regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of  conduct, 
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in the state.
49 Restatement of  Confl ict of  Laws (Second) § 52. Standard, the parent corporation in a multinational 
conglomerate, was held liable for environmental damage caused by an oil spill by a tanker off  
the coast of  France, despite its legal insulation from the vessel via a number of  subsidiary com-
panies. The evidence demonstrated that Standard exercised such dominant control over those 
subsidiaries, including the maintenance of  the relevant vessel, that it was liable for its own neg-
ligence in failing to adequately maintain the vessel. See S Joseph, Corporations and Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing, 2004), 135. As to the responsibility for the maintenance 
of  a ship, it is interesting to note that in the US, the case Reino de España v American Bureau 
of  Shipping (729 FSupp2d. 635), where the Spanish government was claiming the responsibil-
ity of  the company that classifi ed the Prestige (see supra n 41) established that “the relationship 
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tion can become very complicated. The Aliens Tort Claim Act (ATCA),50 on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, the doctrine of  “effects” as applied by 
some courts,51 have been used to establish jurisdiction in international environ-
mental civil claims.
ATCA is designed for civil claims presented by aliens alleging a violation of  
international law norms.52 International environmental claims of  foreigners are 
always presented with reference to the violation of  human rights, such as the 
right to life.53 The interpretative issues in ATCA have a long history which, for 
the purposes of  this paper, can be summarised as follows: fi rst, the “wrong” 
(the violation) has to be of  mutual concern to nations – concern on interference 
with the conduct of  foreign relations54 – and second, the violation requires the 
existence of  purpose.55 Recently, the most controversial interpretative issue has 
to do with the defendant’s nature. Can a corporation be held responsible for 
the violation of  an “international law norm”? After all, environmental claims 
– as other human rights claims – are addressed against them. The response to 
this question depends on which law determines the answer and there are two 
options for the applicable law: forum law or international law.
In September 2010, the US Court of  Appeals of  the 2nd District answered 
this question in the negative, arguing that a corporation cannot be liable under 
international law; so, it was international law that applied. In Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch,56 two judges (Cabranes and Jacobs) supported this conclusion, whilst 
the third judge (Leval) opposed it – though he would have dismissed the case 
for lack of  reasonable inference of  a violation purpose. His vigorous disagree-
between Spain and the society was insuffi cient to warrant the society’s exposure to liability for 
the alleged reckless behaviour in classifying the ship”. The case, resolved on 6 August 2010, is 
now under appeal.
 
50 ATCA 28 USC § 1350, adopted in 1789.
51 The fi rst case to establish the effects doctrine was United States v Aluminum Company of  America, 
148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945).
52 It is a jurisdictional statute providing jurisdiction to US courts for hearing actions for torts 
committed “in violation of  the law of  nations”, see Sosa v Álvarez Machain, 542 US 692 (2004), 
724–25. The court stated that: “courts should require any claim based on the present-day law 
of  nations to rest on a norm of  international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defi ned with a specifi city comparable to” the conduct that was considered actionable in 1789.
53 Requejo Isidro, supra n 7, 50, mentions cases where companies implement their activities in 
countries lacking a democratic tradition and concern for human rights to obtain greater ben-
efi ts.
54 Filártiga v Peña Lara, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
55 Church of  Sudan v Talisman Energy, No 07-0016-cv (2d Cir 10/3/09). On the application of  
ATCA in environmental-related cases, see J Boeving, “Half  Full . . . or Completely Empty? 
Environmental Alien Tort Claims Post Sosa v Alvarez-Machain” (2005) 18 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 109.
56 Kiobel et al. v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, No 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv (2d Cir 9/17/10). Previ-
ously, on the problem of  holding a private actor liable under the ATCA for the environmental 
damage, see A Khokhryakova, “Beanal v Freeport-McMoran, INC: Liability of  a Private Actor for 
an International Environmental Tort Under the Alien Tort Claims Act” (1998) 9 Colombia Jour-
nal of  International Environmental Law & Policy 463.
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ment led him to assert that the majority’s opinion dealt a “substantial blow to 
international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human rights”. 
Although parties fi led a petition for rehearing in banc, the court denied the 
rehearing, arguing that foreign corporations are “creatures of  other States”; 
that there is no international consensus “that US Courts and lawyers have 
the power to bring to court transnational corporations of  other countries to 
inquire into their operations in third countries”; that the liability of  corpora-
tions raise issues that “bear on the life and death of  corporations and are of  
supreme consequence to the nation in which (they) were created” – which may 
imply excluding the tort nature of  the claim in favour of  a corporation char-
acterization; and, fi nally, that if  this was not the decision, resolution in ATCA 
jurisdiction would be slow and invasive and “coerce settlements that have no 
relation to the prospect of  success on the ultimate merits”.
If  this approach is consolidated,57 in order to resort to ATCA it will be nec-
essary to directly sue individuals (managers, directors) and to try to establish 
the subsidiary responsibility of  the corporations. Hence, this would be a, so to 
speak, second step whose resolution would depend on the law applicable to 
the liability. In this regard, it is possible to advance that, in ATCA cases, inter-
national law governs the substance of  the violation while domestic law (US or 
foreign) applies to the liability.58
As to the “effects” criterion, it is necessary to be aware of  the use of  this test 
as a subject matter jurisdiction criterion –through the association with the even-
tual confl ict between US and foreign law59 – whilst in reality it is a mechanism 
for signalling the applicable law.60 However, along these lines, the “purposeful 
direction of  activities at the forum state” can also lead to the establishment of  
specifi c jurisdiction.61
The forum non conveniens motion is a frequent tool in US international civil lit-
igation. The motion is accepted when there is an “adequate alternative” forum. 
The assessment of  this adequacy “on the whole” introduces considerable dis-
cretion in evaluating the situation, for which a series of  criteria aim to take 
57 It is important to note that, on 8 July 2011, the Washington DC Circuit rejected the conclu-
sion in Kiobel in John Doe Vill v Exxon Mobil Corp, No 09-7125, Consolidate with 09-7127, Nos 
09-7134, 09-7135. The 11th Circuit has also resolved cases in favour of  establishing corporate 
responsibility under ATCA and the 9th and 7th Circuits have cases under consideration at the 
time of  writing. On 8 June 2011 a Petition for Writ of  Certiorari in the Kiobel case was fi led 
before the US Supreme Court (http://harvardhumanrights.fi les.wordpress.com/2011/06/kio-
bel-petition-for-writ-fi nal-6-6-2011.pdf).
58 See supra.
59 In the antitrust fi eld, the Supreme Court so dictated in Hartford Fire Ins v California, 509 US 764 
(1993).
60 The Restatement of  Foreign Relations (Third) § 402.1(c), categorises it as a “jurisdiction to prescribe” 
basis.
61 See Cominco case, infra n 116.
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public62 and private63 interests into consideration. In the environmental case-
law the motion was accepted in some cases64 – of  which Aguinda v Texaco can 
be highlighted due to the recent news on its development65 – and rejected in 
others, particularly in Carijano.66 In this case, whilst the district court accepted 
the motion based – among other things – on the fact that the defendant (Occi-
dental) would waive any personal jurisdiction defences to appear in the Peruvian 
courts, the appellate court, rejected it, arguing that, though the motion may 
be granted “even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is less 
favourable to the plaintiff ’s chance of  recovery”, it has to be rejected when 
the alternative forum presents a “clearly unsatisfactory remedy”.67 Beyond the 
resort to forum non conveniens motions and in the light of  the frequent settlement 
of  these kinds of  cases, it is at least interesting to note a recent curious case 
where, before resolving the jurisdiction issue, a court decided to refer the case 
to mediation.68
From these cases, a restrictive international jurisdictional trend may be per-
ceived in US jurisprudence. This trend appears at a time where the discourses 
on the “implicit discrimination” that US defendants suffer in their own national 
courts when it comes to actions that have no other connection with the forum, 
get even louder; which, in the end, implies that US corporations suffer from 
harder conditions when investing abroad.69 Along this line of  thought, and in 
62 The public criteria are the level of  court congestion, the diffi culties if  it is necessary to apply 
foreign law, the burdens on citizens who serve on the jury, etc. In this regard the US plea is 
very different from the plea in the UK, see Lubbe v Cape plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545, 1565 and 
Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 47, 365.
63 The private criteria are the access to proof, the availability of  compulsory process to secure 
witnesses, the alternative forum presents a “clearly unsatisfactory” remedy, etc. For a brief  
analysis of  forum non conveniens in the US, see C Kotuby, “Private International Law before the 
US Supreme Court: Recent Terms in Review” (2008) 4 Journal of  Private International Law 61, 
78–81.
64 Re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal (India), 634 FSupp 842 (SDNY 1986), affi rmed 809 
F2d 195 (2d Cir 1987), Flores v Southern Peru Cooper Corp, 441 F3d 233 (2d Cir 2003).
65 See supra n 4.
66 Members and supporters of  a group of  indigenous people who have long resided along the 
rivers of  the northern Peruvian rainforest sued Occidental Petroleum for environmental damage 
arising from the use of  out-of-date methods for separating crude oil which, allegedly, resulted 
in millions of  gallons of  toxic oil byproducts being dumped in waterways.
67 Carijano et al v Occidental Petroleum Corp, No 08-56187 (9th Cir, 6 December 2010). The appel-
late court was particularly concerned that the district court did not impose any condition on 
the dismissal, specifi cally that Occidental would waive any statute of  limitations defence in the 
Peruvian proceedings. It argued that “dismissal on the basis of  forum non conveniens is improper 
when a lawsuit would be time-barred in the alternative jurisdiction”.
68 Sarei v Rio Tinto, No 09-56381 (9th Cir, 26 October 2010) involved plaintiffs from New Guinea 
and an Anglo-Australian corporation as defendant. Judge Kleinfeld, dissenting, stated that “it 
is not possible to refer to mediation before deciding on jurisdiction, which was possibly non-
existent”.
69 AO Sykes, “Transnational Tort Litigation as a Trade and Investment Issue”, Working Paper 
no 331 of  the JM Olin Program in Law and Economics of  the Stanford Law School, January 
2007, 1–3 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=956668 ).
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order to discourage this kind of  litigation – particularly on the basis of  ATCA 
– Chevron (the successor to Texaco) fi led a civil law suit against the lawyers and 
consultants of  the Ecuador case against the company, accusing them of  fraud-
ulent litigation, and, on this basis, Chevron also sought – and obtained – a 
declaration that any judgment against it would not be recognised in the US 
shortly before the conclusion of  the Ecuadorian process.70
D. APPLICABLE LAW
Once jurisdiction has been established, the US or EU Member State court 
will have to determine the applicable law. However, even before presenting the 
claim in one jurisdiction, plaintiffs usually make a prospective analysis of  the 
applicable law since it will be this law that will defi ne the existence of  the tort 
and the measures and compensation that can be prescribed to deal with the 
environmental harm.
1. European Union
The Rome II Regulation establishes uniform rules for the determination of  the 
law governing non-contractual obligation claims.71 These rules are applicable if  
no other international special agreement pertains (Article 28). As noted above, 
it is rarely the case that international environmental civil liability agreements 
introduce confl ict-of-laws norms and, when they mention the applicable law, 
they refer to forum law including its confl ict rules.72 Hence, although these con-
70 Chevron v Dozinger, 11-00691. The action was fi led on 1 February 2011 before the US District 
Court of  the Southern State of  New York, and a temporary order was adopted on 8 February 
(see supra n 8).
71 Regulation 684/2007, on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), applica-
ble from 11 January 2009 (Art 32) to events giving rise to damage after 19 August 2007 (Art 
31) in all EU Member States with the exception of  Denmark. Its confl ict norms are partially 
coincident with rules 5 and 6 of  the ILA Resolution, Toronto 6/2006, see supra n 38. Rule 5 
provides for the application of  the law chosen by the parties after the dispute, or the law of  the 
lex causae or the lex damni, at the victim´s choice; otherwise, the lex damni applies. The scope of  
the applicable law extends to the conditions and extent of  liability, the grounds for its excep-
tion, limitation or division, the existence and kinds of  injury for which compensation may be 
due; the measures that the court can take to prevent or terminate the damage (within the limits 
of  its powers), the assessment of  the damage, the assignability or inheritance of  a compensation 
right, the persons entitled to compensation, the liability for acts of  another person, the manner 
in which an obligation may be extinguished, rules of  prescription and limitation (including the 
determination of  the commencement of  a period of  prescription of  limitation and the inter-
ruption and suspension of  the period). On the history of  Rome II, see JL Iglesias Buhigues, 
“El largo camino del Reglamento Roma II” (2007) VII Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional 
Privado 97–108, and R Gil-Nievas, “El proceso negociador del Reglamento Roma II: obstáculos 
y resultados” (2007) VII Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 109–85.
72 See supra n 24. According to Art 29 of  the Regulation, Member States had to notify the Com-
mission of  these agreements by 11 July 2008. On 17 December 2010, the list of  agreements 
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ventions do not affect in principle the application of  Rome II, it is clear that 
their substantive rules will have to be applied – whatever the designated law 
of  the tort is – when the material, spatial and temporal aspects of  the conven-
tion are fulfi lled. The designated applicable law would, then, serve to fi ll any 
gaps left by the material rules of  the Convention. However, though it could 
have been argued that once the convention provides jurisdiction rules, substan-
tive forum law applies, this conclusion cannot be derived from the text of  the 
conventions73 and, therefore, would not be respectful of  the imperative char-
acter of  the Rome II Regulation. It is true that in these cases forum law will 
normally be the lex locus damni – coinciding with one of  the Rome II criteria 
– but claimants would be deprived from exercising the choice option that the 
Regulation provides. Hence, Rome II remains useful not only when Member 
States are not parties to the civil liability conventions, but also when they are 
parties in respect of  damages not covered by the material scope of  the conven-
tions, when the conventions do not have confl ict-of-laws rules and even when 
they do have them if  they refer back to the private international law rules of  
the forum.
Under Rome II, “non-contractual obligation” is an autonomous concept 
(Recital 11) that includes actual and potential (Article 2(2)) environmental 
damage understood “as meaning adverse change in a natural resource, such as 
water, land or air, impairment of  a function performed by that resource for the 
benefi t of  another natural resource or the public, or impairment of  the vari-
ability among living organisms” (Recital 24). This includes the so-called purely 
environmental damage together with personal and patrimonial environmental 
harms. However, materially, acta iuri imperii (Article 1(1))74 and nuclear damage 
are excluded (Article 2(1)(f))75. The Regulation does not use the expression “vic-
that had been notifi ed was published ([2010] OJ C347/7) and only Romania mentioned the 
LLMC-76, and its amending Protocol-96. As has been noted, the confl ict rule of  this agree-
ment does not concern civil liability.
 
73 See supra n 24.
74 This implies that, for acta iuri gestionis, the Regulation applies and, as a consequence, national 
administrative laws that, as in the Spanish case, establish a distinctive administrative patrimo-
nial responsibility regime regardless of  the private or public nature of  the claim in which the 
administration is involved, have to be set aside. On this issue, see D Sancho Villa, “Exclusión 
de la responsabilidad del Estado por actos iure imperii en Roma II: Consideraciones sobre la 
aplicación del Reglamento a la responsabilidad del Estado por actos iure gestiones” (2007) VII 
Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 353–68.
75 This exclusion is explained in the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regula-
tion on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), COM(2003) 427 fi nal, 
22/7/2003, 9, “by the importance of  the economic and State interests at stake” and Member 
States’ participation in international agreements on nuclear civil liability. However, following 
the Hamburg Group of  Private International Law “Comments on the European Commission’s 
draft Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law applicable to non-contractual obligations”, 
23/9/2002, www.mpipriv.de/de/data/pdf/commentshamburggroup.pdf, p 9, the inclusion 
would have been advisable. On the confl ict-of-laws regime of  nuclear environmental damage 
see Fallon et al, supra n 25, 547–72.
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tims” but refers to the “person seeking compensation for damage” (Article 7) 
and the “person sustaining the damage” (Recital 25), which means that the 
claimant can be an individual or a juridical, public or private person. It is 
important to note that the law determined to be applicable to environmental 
claims will cover a wide range of  aspects – including illicit conduct – and there-
fore helps to avoid the discussions on the characterisation of  certain issues as 
procedural or substantive,76 which are generally considered to be substantive.77 
Moreover, when environmental damage is caused by the operations of  a local 
company belonging to an international concern, questions as to the liability of  
the foreign parent company may arise. Despite the inclusion of  the “liability for 
the acts of  another person” in the extent of  the applicable law, if  the parent 
company is claimed to be liable solely in its shareholder’s capacity, its liability 
is excluded from the scope of  the Regulation (Article 1(2)(d)) as being of  com-
pany-law nature,78 and hence it will be determined through the application of  
the forum’s confl ict-of-laws rules.
To begin with, when Rome II applies, the parties’ agreement on the law 
applicable is accepted within certain limits (Article 1479). The application of  the 
chosen law will not avoid the application, on the one hand, of  the only law 
connected to the tort where the event giving rise to the damage occurred, and, 
on the other, of  the EU mandatory rules when the tort is only linked to one 
(or more) Member State(s).80 The agreement can be express or can be implied 
– for example, when appearing before the court parties do not refer to the 
otherwise applicable law (Article 7) and base their claim on the lex fori.81 As to 
the time of  the agreement, it is possible to state that ex post (after the damage) 
76 Recital 2 of  the Regulation states that non-contractual obligations are to be “understood as an 
autonomous concept . . . confl ict-of-law rules set out in this Regulation . . . also cover non-
contractual obligations arising out of  strict liability”, and Art 15 extends the application of  the 
designated law to a wide range of  issues, including – beyond the basis and extent of  the lia-
bility and persons entitled to compensation for damages sustained personally – the preventive 
measures (injunctions).
77 As T Kadner Graciano, “Law Applicable to Cross Border Damage to the Environment” 
(2007) 9 Yearbook of  Private International Law 76–77, explains, injunction claims for environmental 
damage originated from immovable property were qualifi ed in some countries as a propriety 
issue, whilst under the Rome II they are to be qualifi ed as non-contractual obligations. See also 
E Schoeman, “Rome II and the Substance–Procedure Dichotomy” [2010] Lloyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 81; and A Gray, “Loss Distribution Issues in Multinational Tort Claims: 
Giving Substance to Substance” (2008) 4 Journal of  Private International Law 279, who refer to 
the changes in the procedural–substantive dichotomy particularly in common law systems.
78 Bogdan, supra n 12, 105.
79 Parties’ agreement remains available since, unlike other special confl ict-of-laws rules of  the Reg-
ulation (Arts 8 and 6) it is not excluded expressly. This interpretation is sustained by the UK 
Guide, infra n 92 at 10 (para 30).
80 In this case, EU mandatory rules – as incorporated in national law – would in any case be 
applied as being part of  the law of  the forum – which would necessarily be an EU Member 
State mandatory provision (Art 16). See supra.
81 This option has been proposed by SC Symeonides, “Party Autonomy in Rome I and II from 
a Comparative Perspective” (2010) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697372, 540–41.
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agreements would be a rather strange case in practice. Ex ante agreements can 
be envisioned – and are increasingly common – if  parties maintained a previ-
ous relationship, basically contractual, and the choice-of-law clause is intended 
to extend to their non-contractual obligations. In order to avoid problems of  
abuse when parties are not equal (weak/strong), agreements will only be valid 
if  they are freely negotiated, the choice is expressed or demonstrated with rea-
sonable certainty, and the parties are both pursuing a “commercial activity”. 
The fact that both parties are involved in commercial activity does not exclude 
possible abuses of  larger companies over small and medium-sized enterprises.82 
To cover these cases, the only option that could, perhaps, be explored would be 
resorting to Recital 31 of  the Regulation where it is stated that “[in] establish-
ing the existence of  the agreement. . . . Protection should be given to weaker 
parties by imposing certain conditions on the choice.” However, it would be 
necessary to wait for the ECJ, fi rst, to confi rm the availability of  this interpret-
ing option – whose diffi culties cannot be ignored, to begin with, because there 
is no rule in the Regulation that refers to this case and the only basis of  the 
limitation would be the general reading of  the recital83 – as well as, secondly, 
in the affi rmative, to provide the guidance on the conditions that could possibly 
be imposed on the validity of  the choice.
In the absence of  choice, the law applicable would be the one correspond-
ing to the locus damni (direct damage)84 or the claimant may choose the law of  
the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred (Article 7). 
This is the so-called ubiquity rule, which establishes a privilege in favour of  
the claimant.85 This privilege has been questioned as unjustifi ed when applied 
to non-pure environmental harm due to the fact that it does not fulfi l a “pre-
82 Ibid, 544–46.
83 In this respect, Recital 23 of  Regulation 593/2008, of  the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil, of  17 June 2008, on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ 
L177/6, seems to be different since it states that as regards “contracts concluded with parties 
regarded as being weaker, those parties should be protected by confl ict-of-law rules that are 
more favourable to their interests than the general rules”; which implies that more favourable 
confl icts rules are designed and established for them (as explained in the following recitals). In 
Brussels I, Recital 13 refers to the special jurisdiction rules to protect the weaker party only in 
consumer, insurance and employment contracts. However, recitals only help to explain what is 
intended by the text and therefore it is likely that the protection afforded by the “conditions 
on the choice” is only intended for the parties that are not engaged in a “commercial activity” 
because commercial operators are deemed to be able to insure against the risks: see Beaumont 
and McEleavy, supra n 47, 629–30.
84 On the basis of  ECJ jurisprudence on Brussels I (Marinari). See supra n 43.
85 Recital 25 of  the Regulation states: “Regarding environmental damage, Article 174 of  the 
Treaty, which provides that there should be a high level of  protection based on the precaution-
ary principle and the principle that preventive action should be taken, the principle of  priority 
for corrective action at source and the principle that the polluter pays, fully justifi es the use of  
the principle of  discriminating in favour of  the person sustaining the damage.” However, it has 
been criticised that this specifi c rule is not extended to other human rights-related damages, see 
Enneking, supra n 3, 331.
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ventive” task, but rather a compensatory function. Hence, it is not clear that 
environmental liability claims should be privileged ahead of  other non-contrac-
tual claims.86 According to Recital 25 of  the Regulation, the time for making 
this choice will be determined by the procedural law of  the forum.87 It has 
been argued that the absence of  common rules in this regard may lead to some 
uncertainty and provide an incentive for forum shopping. This issue could, 
eventually, be harmonised if  the ECJ were to develop common standards as 
to when the Article 7 choice has to be made.88 However, such harmonisation 
of  the procedural law of  the Member States would not be consistent with the 
terms of  the Recital.
The locus damni criterion provides a just and equitable solution. The high 
probability of  regulatory fragmentation –especially if  the damage is suffered 
in different states – and the lack of  foreseeability for the defendant are less 
important than the other interests involved – such as the protection of  the 
environment, the polluter-pays principle and the “preventive” function of  lia-
bility rules.89 On the other hand, the criterion has also been criticised as it 
offers pseudo-impunity for European companies acting in countries whose legal 
rules on civil liability for environmental damage are defi cient90 – however, in 
this regard, forum mandatory rules can operate as a counter-weight.91 On the 
determination of  the locus damni, the UK guide on the application of  Rome 
II92 says that personal damages will be located where they were suffered (resi-
dence); that property damages will be located where the property was situated 
when damaged; and, fi nally, that the economic loss will be located where it 
was suffered.93
The option of  the law of  the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred aims at enhancing the environmental protection that should 
86 M Amores Conradi and E Torralba Mendiola, “XI Tesis sobre el estatuto delictual” [2004] 
Revista electrónica de estudios internacionales no 8, 29–30. Along these lines, see A Crespo Hernán-
dez, “Daños al medio ambiente y regla de la ubicuidad en el art. 8 del futuro Reglamento 
Roma II”, InDret, July 2006 (www.indret.com).
87 The second sentence of  Recital 25 of  the Regulation states “The question of  when the person 
seeking compensation can make the choice of  the law applicable should be determined in 
accordance with the law of  the Member State in which the court is seized.”
88 Kadner Graziano, supra n 77, 76.
89 Among others, see Kadner Graziano, ibid, 72–73, affi rming that locus damni is a good connec-
tion because victims will usually expect to be compensated according to the standards of  the 
law of  the place where their rights and interests are damaged and will consider this solution to 
be just and equitable: all the victims that suffer damage in the same place are treated equally; 
and the responsible persons are also treated equally (foreseeability is not an issue in environ-
mental claims). 
90 Gil Nievas, supra n 71, 150.
91 See infra.
92 UK Ministry of  Justice, Guidance on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations, 22 January 
2009, p. 5 (para 10).
93 See ECJ in Marinari, supra n 42. It has to be acknowledged that locating economic loss is, 
 nevertheless, a complex issue: see Lehmann, supra n 43.
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be available within the EU.94 It is logically presumed that the victim will choose 
the law with the higher standard of  protection and, therefore, the effect of  
“raising protection standards” exists irrespective of  the place of  the harm 
(intra/extra-EU). It is true, anyway, that the protection enhancement can take 
place when the Rome II confl ict-of-laws rule is applicable by a Member State 
court. Hence, for harms suffered in developing countries, it would be useful in 
cases of  European companies acting abroad if  the “cause” of  the harm could 
be located in Europe.
Determining the law of  the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred is, then, a crucial question that has already been given an 
autonomous interpretation by the ECJ in the context of  Article 5(3) of  Brussels 
I. In that context the ECJ has already established that Article 5(3) is justifi ed on 
the existence of  a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and 
the courts, other than those of  the defendant’s domicile, for reasons relating 
to the sound administration of  justice and the effi cacious conduct of  proceed-
ings.95 The diffi culties come from cases where there are several material events 
or causes that gave rise to the damage – perhaps because there are multiple 
tortfeasors – and each of  them took place in a different country. In these cir-
cumstances, it would be important to determine the extent to which each event 
contributed to the harm and, in case of  the claimant opting for the law of  
the country of  the event giving rise to the damage, the most substantial event 
would be the best one to be picked as the applicable law.96 If  it was impossible 
to establish the most substantial causal event or when the events were equally 
substantial, the wording of  the Regulation could lead to applying the laws of  
each of  the countries where events giving rise to the damage occurred, with 
the consequent legal fragmentation of  the author’s (or authors’) responsibility, 
though it may seem more effi cient to ask the victim to choose one among all of  
them (particularly in cases where there is only one author). Even if  this solution 
is accepted, in cases where there are a number of  victims, each of  them could 
pick a different law of  the event giving rise to the damage and, therefore, this 
would lead to a fragmentation of  the regulation of  the responsibility – which 
(even with only one author) cannot be said to be surprising or unacceptable in 
this fi eld, especially when it comes to the determination of  the compensation 
for different claimants.
94 UK Guide, supra n 92, 9 (para 24). The Guide seems to follow the idea expressed initially in the 
Proposal for a Regulation, see supra n 75, 19, when it says: “Considering the Union’ s more 
general objectives in environmental matters, the point is not only to respect the victim’s legiti-
mate interests but also to establish a legislative policy that contributes to raising the general 
level of  environmental protection, especially as the author of  the environmental damage, unlike 
other torts or delicts, generally derives an economic benefi t from his harmful activity.”
95 Case C-51/97 Réunion Européenne v Spliethoff ’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] ECR I-6511 (paras 27 
and 37). See also Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 47, 312–14.
96 Bogdan, supra n 12, 104, points in this respect to the accessorium sequitur principle.
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Along this line, in cases of  multiple tortfeasors causing (jointly) the damage 
in a number of  countries, the option for claimants to choose between the law 
of  the country of  the event giving rise to the damage or the law of  the place 
of  damage should be unique for their particular claim. Anyhow, different laws 
may be applicable for the determination of  the responsibility of  each of  the 
tortfeasors, quite possibly creating the problem of  how to allocate the burden 
of  compensation between them.97 This presents an adaptation problem for 
which there is no obvious solution in Rome II and, without excluding the pos-
sibility of  resorting to the ECJ to obtain the appropriate interpretative guidance 
on the uniform application of  the Regulation, the EU Member States’ courts 
will have to fi nd solutions on a case-by-case basis.98
One may wonder whether the event giving rise to the damage can be a 
decision taken at the corporation’s headquarters. Despite the fact that this pos-
sibility may seem a bit awkward, Directive 2004/35 on environmental liabil-
ity with regard to the prevention and remedying of  environmental damages,99 
opens an option for accepting its characterisation as an event giving rise to 
damage in EU law. The Directive establishes (Articles 6 and 8) that the respon-
sible person is the “operator”, defi ned as any “natural or legal person, private 
or public, who operates or controls the occupational activity or, where this is provided for 
in international legislation, to whom decisive economic power over the technical functioning of  
such activity has been delegated, including the holder of  a permit or authorization 
for such an activity” (Article 2). In this realm, the fact that in the UK “decision 
making” has been used as an element in the balancing of  the adequacy of  the 
jurisdiction could also be brought into the equation to reinforce its characteri-
sation as an event giving rise to the damage. In the Lubbe case, the resolution 
of  issues relative to the responsibility of  a parent company for ensuring the 
observance of  proper standards by its overseas subsidiaries was said to be likely 
to involve an inquiry into what part the parent company played in controlling 
the operations of  the group – what directors and employees knew or ought to 
97 Art 20 of  Rome II refers to a different situation in which one of  the authors has already paid 
the indemnifi cation and claims compensation from the others. It is clearly a different tort which 
would lead to the payers’ law, a criteria that could be corrected by the lex domicilii communis 
or, through an escape clause, to a closer relationship that could be the law governing the pre-
 existing relationship. On this issue, see TW Dornis, “Contribution and Indemnifi cation Among 
Joint Tortfeasors in Multi-State Confl ict Cases: A Study of  Doctrine and the Current Law in 
the US and under the Rome II Regulation” (2008) 4 Journal of  Private International Law 237.
98 JC Fernández Rozas, “Coordinación de ordenamientos jurídicos estatales y problemas de adap-
tación”, [2009] Revista Mexicana de Derecho Internacional Privado y Comparado no 25, 9–44. Showing 
the fragmentation problem in Rome II and criticising dépeçage as a tool for making its con-
fl ict rules more fl exible, see A Mills, “The Application of  Multiple Laws Under the Rome II 
Regulation” in J Ahern and W Binchy (eds), The Rome II Regulation on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 151–52.
99 Directive 2004/35/CE of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of  environmental damage, 
[2004] OJ L143.
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have known, what action was taken and not taken, whether it owed a duty of  
care to people overseas and whether if  so, that duty was broken. Hence, much 
of  the evidence relevant for this inquiry would be documentary and much of  
it would be found in the offi ces of  the parent company.100 Although this rea-
soning may help to locate the event giving rise to damage at the corporation’s 
headquarters, it should not be forgotten that the characterisation issue can also 
bring up the distinction between torts and the “law of  companies” and the 
latter is left out of  the scope of  Rome II (Article 1(2)(d))101 and, therefore, 
would be governed by national confl ict rules.
In any case, if  according to Rome II, an EU Member State court has to 
apply a foreign law but ignores its content, the Regulation has no clear rule on 
how to proceed,102 hence forum law will determine the outcome of  the situa-
tion which, at least, in a number of  jurisdictions will lead to the application of  
the lex fori.103 Therefore, the absence of  adequate information about the for-
eign applicable law of  a non-Member State, especially of  a developing country, 
could serve to enhance the protection level in a particular environmental claim 
through the application of  forum law. Finally, it is important to note that Rome 
II leaves no role in environmental claims for the laws of  parties’ residence/
100 Lubbe v Cape Plc, supra n 47.
101 Art 1(2)(d) refers to the “law of  companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated 
regarding matters such as the creation, by registration or otherwise, legal capacity, internal 
organisation or winding-up of  companies and other bodies corporate or unincorporated, the 
personal liability of  offi cers and members as such for the obligations of  the company or body 
and the personal liability of  auditors to a company or to its members in the statutory audits 
of  accounting documents.”
102 The Regulation contains a review clause (Art 30(1)(i)) requiring the Commission to publish a 
horizontal study on the way in which foreign law is treated in the different jurisdictions in the 
EU and on the extent to which the courts of  Member States apply foreign law in practice 
under Rome II and asking the Commission to make proposals to adapt Rome II if  necessary.
103 If  foreign law is not invoked and proved, for example, in Spain the lex fori applies, and, in 
the UK, the content of  the foreign law is assumed to be the same as the law of  the forum, 
so technically the foreign law is applied but in practice the law of  the forum is applied. See 
C Esplugues, JL Iglesias and G Palao (eds), Application of  Foreign Law (Sellier, 2011). The 
problem of  the burden of  proof  (which may not be in the interest of  the plaintiff) and the 
role that the judges play in obtaining information about foreign law in the private inter-
national law of  the EU is another issue that, for the time being and despite the European 
Parliament’s intention to include it in the Rome II text (Art 13 of  its Legislative resolution, 
P6_TA(2005)0284, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2005-
-0284&language=EN&ring=A6-2005-0211), has been analysed mainly through a European 
project “The Application of  Foreign Law by Judicial and Non-Judicial Authorities” (Commis-
sion General Directorate on Justice, Freedom and Security, Project JLS/CJ/2007-1/03). The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law had previously initiated its work in this area, 
which is still ongoing (see Conclusions and Recommendations adopted by the Council in April 
2011, www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_concl2011e.pdf, p 3). See Prel Doc 11 (March 2009) 
for the Meeting of  Experts on Global Co-operation on the Provisions of  Online Legal Informa-
tion on National Laws (The Hague, 19–21 October 2008) (A) Accessing the Content of  Foreign Law 
and the Need for the Development of  a Global Instrument in this Area – A Possible Way Ahead, (B) Access-
ing the Content of  Foreign Law, and (C) Accessing the content of  Foreign Law. Compilation of  Responses to 
the Questionnaire of  October 2008.
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domicile or for the manifestly more closely connected law (like a previous con-
tractual relationship).104
Hence, it is possible to conclude that fragmentation of  the legal responses 
can be more the rule than the exception in civil environmental claims. Beyond 
the application of  the (limited) confl ict rules of  the civil liability conventions 
(that, anyway, refer to forum law “including confl ict of  laws”), trying to sum-
marise the Rome II applicable law options, a number of  situations can be 
envisaged. To begin with, if  there is one claimant, one country of  damage and 
the event giving rise to that damage (cause) took place in one country, then the 
law applicable is only one; be it the law of  the country of  damage or the law 
of  the country of  the cause, depending on the claimant´s choice. If  there is 
one claimant suffering the damage in one country, but there are various events 
giving rise to the damage (causes)105 located in different countries, there is no 
risk of  fragmentation. However, the nature of  the causes becomes relevant in 
the light of  the claimants’ choice since, when none of  the causes can be consid-
ered to be the most substantial it may be that the claimant’s choice options are 
widened, as mentioned above, as they can choose among the law of  any of  the 
countries where events giving rise to the damage occurred rather than possibly 
just the law of  the country where the most substantial causal event took place. 
If  there is one claimant but the damage is suffered in two or more countries, 
the fragmentation risk shows up since this claimant can choose to apply the 
different laws of  the place where the damage was suffered instead of  opting for 
the law of  the place of  the cause of  the damage. Thereby the tortfeasor can be 
subjected to different liability systems for each part of  the direct damage.
If  there is more than one claimant – suffering the damage in the same or in 
different countries – and one place of  cause, the choice option each claimant 
is given leaves the gate open to different laws regulating the tortfeasor´s liabil-
ity. Finally, the fragmentation risk appears again when there is not only more 
than one claimant – suffering the damage in the same or different countries – 
but also more than one cause located in different states. This is especially so if  
none of  those causes can be considered to be the essential cause of  the harm. 
104 Whilst Art 7 – a special rule in Chapter II of  the Regulation – refers to Art 4 – the general 
rule of  Chapter II – para 1 expressly, paras 2 and 3 of  this Article are not mentioned; therefore 
it can be understood that they are not applicable to environmental claims. However, Bogdan, 
supra n 12, 105, argues for the analogous application of  Art 4.3 (or the lex fori) in defending the 
resort to the law of  the registration (fl ag) of  the ship, aircraft, spacecraft, etc, when the damage 
(or the event causing it) takes place in the Antarctic, the high seas or outer space. Along this 
line, see Basedow, supra n 19, 131–32, 136.
105 The various causes can be concurrent or alternative. Art 3:103 EPTL (see supra n 13), Alterna-
tive causes: in case of  multiple activities, where each of  them alone would have been suffi cient 
to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one in fact caused it, each activity is 
regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding to the likelihood that it may have caused the 
victim’s damage. Art 3:102 EPTL, Concurrent causes: in case of  multiple activities, where each 
of  them alone would have caused the damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as a 
cause of  the victim’s damage.
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In this last case the claimants’ choice options are widened because they can 
choose the law of  any of  the places of  the events giving rise to the damage.
It is important to remember that, whatever the law applicable is, the EU 
Member States that are parties to the environmental civil liability conventions 
are compelled to apply their material norms. In addition, when the court of  an 
EU Member State that is not a party to the civil liability conventions is directed 
to the application of  the law of  a state party to the convention, it would be 
reasonable to understand that the applicable material norms would be those 
of  the Convention since they constitute the civil liability material unifi cation 
in that country.106
Beyond the potential fragmentation in the Rome II Regulation of  the 
tortfeasor´s liability towards each claimant, it is important to look at the 
potential accumulation of  applicable laws, or laws that have to be taken into 
consideration in each of  these cases. The Rome II Regulation leaves a role for 
certain rules in force at the place and time of  the event giving rise to the liabil-
ity, ie the “rules of  safety and conduct” of  the locus causae (Article 17). Although 
they do not have to be applied as such, they must be “taken into account as a 
matter of  fact . . . in assessing the conduct” of  the person claimed to be lia-
ble.107 National administrative authorisations can be considered “rules of  safety 
and conduct” as they are the result of  their application.108 Their existence has 
different effects in each administrative regime and, even in the same regime, 
depending on the sector or nature of  the authorisation.109 In this regard, a 
Grand Chamber of  the ECJ has decided that the Austrian system on injunc-
tions against environmental damage from power stations is unlawful as being 
discriminatory in character on the grounds of  nationality. Although the legal 
rules in Austria precluded bringing actions for injunctions in relation to envi-
ronmental damage caused by Austrian power stations that had been granted 
offi cial authorization, they did not prevent such injunctions against power sta-
tions that had been granted offi cial authorisation in neighbouring Member 
106 Supporting this idea, see Basedow, supra n 19, 126. This would anyhow be the case when 
Lugano is applicable since it stands for the indirect application of  its norms (see supra n 17).
107 Hence, in this regard, H Muir Watt, in Confl ict of  Laws, 2 April 2008 (www.confl ictofl aws.net), 
agreed with SC Symeonides (see supra n 81) on the fact that only through Art 16 (see infra) is 
it possible to give effect to the prohibitive rules of  the state of  the place of  conduct, which – 
considering the state’s interests – are more relevant in environmental pollution cases than the 
ones of  the place of  the damage – particularly when this one has a less stringent standard of  
care. 
108 In this regard, the narrow link between administrative and civil actions also has to be noted. 
This is particularly so when the outcome of  the civil action may be dependent – in terms of  
national procedural law – on the result of  the dispute about the administrative permissions.
109 It can exclude the civil law actions; it can exclude the possibility to obtain injunctions but not 
to obtain damages; or it can also be that it does not affect claims under private law at all – 
and this was the case in Bier (see supra n 42). On the incidence of  administrative authorisations 
in waste disposal pollution, see M Vinaixa Miquel, La responsabilidad civil por contaminación trans-
fronteriza derivada de residuos. (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 2006), 411 et seq.
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States.110 Considering the maintenance of  different environmental protection 
levels within the EU111 and its incidence on the application of  the mutual rec-
ognition principle112 – which works as a sort of  lex originis rule113 – the practice 
in Holland and Austria, which has been recommended as sources of  inspiration 
for Rome II,114 lead to taking these authorisations into consideration if: (i) the 
emissions are in accordance with public international law, (ii) the conditions of  
foreign law to issue such licenses are similar to the conditions existing for them 
in the lex fori, and (iii) the party seeking compensation or an injunction has had 
the chance to participate, be heard and raise objections in the administrative 
procedure that lead to the issue of  the license.
Moreover, forum mandatory rules (Article 16) can never be excluded115 and, 
fi nally, the public policy exception (Article 26) can preclude the application of  
a foreign law. Despite being a national concept, the ECJ can review public 
policy limits when applied by national courts.116 The Commission Proposal for 
the Rome II Regulation said that
“[O]nly when a rule confl icts with fundamental legal principles of  the forum, or when 
its application leads to results which confl ict with such principles is the court allowed 
not to apply the designated rule and to replace it by a rule of  the lex fori instead”.117
110 Case C-115/08 Land Oberösterreich (Austria) v CEZ (Czech Rep) [2009] ECR I-10265. The Court 
also established that aims of  a purely economic nature, as well as the protection of  life, health, 
environment or property rights, cannot be qualifi ed as potential justifi cations for a difference 
in treatment on grounds of  nationality. In this case the EAEC Treaty provided for a signifi -
cant degree of  harmonisation of  health and safety standards throughout the EU in relation to 
nuclear power installations.
111 EU environmental regulation takes place mostly through Directives. See http://europa.eu/leg-
islation_summaries/environment/index_en.htm. 
112 It is important to note that, interpreting Directive 1999/31 (on the landfi ll of  waste, [1999] OJ 
L182), the ECJ has established that higher national standards are compatible with EU law and 
that, where they exist, the proportionality principle is not applicable to them as long as they 
do not affect the rest of  EU law (para 64), Case C-6/03 Deponiezweckverband Eiterköpfe v Land 
Rheinland-Pfaizl [2005] ECR I-2753.
113 M Gardeñes Santiago, La aplicación de la regla de reconocimiento mutuo y su incidencia en el comercio de 
mercancías y servicios en el ámbito comunitario e internacional (Eurolex, 1999), 209–16, explains that the 
need to refer to the lex originis does not lead one to consider this principle as a confl ict-of-laws 
rule since it does not provide for the application of  the law but just to take it into considera-
tion.
114 Kadner Graziano, supra n 77, 78.
115 Joined Cases C-369 and 376/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-8453: “[N]ational provisions compliance 
with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of  the political, social or eco-
nomic order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons 
present on the national territory of  that Member State and all legal relationships within that 
State” (para 30).
116 See Case C-38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973 (paras 27–28). The EU legislature has 
attempted to place some limits on the ECJ in any attempt to harmonise the nature of  public 
policy: see Beaumont and McEleavy, supra n 47, 703–05.
117 See the Rome II Proposal (see supra n 75), 28, explanatory comments on Art 22 (emphasis 
added).
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In addition, the application of  the lex fori can occur when the content of  for-
eign law is not invoked by the parties even when the foreign law is not in 
breach of  the public policy or mandatory rules of  the forum.118 Anyhow, resort-
ing to forum law to avoid the application of  foreign norms manifestly contrary 
to forum public policy, or to obey and respect the mandatory character of  
forum norms, can serve to enhance the protection level in a particular envi-
ronmental claim.
It is possible to conclude that, beyond the compliance with environmental 
civil liability treaties, that lead to the application of  their own uniform mate-
rial rules, the EU system for determining the applicable law – which, as noted 
above, will be used even in cases where the environmental treaties have confl ict-
of-laws rules to establish the substantive law that will complement and complete 
the material norms laid down in those treaties – can lead to an environmental 
tortfeasor being subject to a number of  national civil liability laws. The courts 
must also take into consideration the rules of  “safety and conduct” (admin-
istrative authorisations) of  the place of  the event giving rise to the liability. 
Moreover, when the law applicable is not the law of  the forum, the applicable 
law will not be applied to the extent that it is contrary to the public policy or 
mandatory rules of  the forum.
2. United States of  America
The US deals with applicable law issue surrounding torts in a very differ-
ent way. As to the parties’ agreements on the choice of  law, ex post election 
would be a rather rare, though acceptable, case. There is no uniform answer 
to the admissibility of  ex ante agreements – increasingly common when there 
are previous relations (contracts) between the parties and they match pre-dis-
pute agreements which extend to non-contractual claims. Some state´s laws 
prohibit ex ante agreements in tort issues (Louisiana, Oregon); others are silent. 
Nevertheless, jurisprudence tends to admit them as an issue of  the intent of  
the parties, which depends on the language of  the clause. The main diffi culty 
would be to control the possible abuses in cases of  unequal parties (weak/
strong). The only way to deal with abuses is that courts police the party auton-
omy with regard to non-contractual issues.119
In the absence of  agreement, the locus delicti rule, beyond being incorporated 
into the Restatement of  Confl ict of  Laws,120 is followed with varying degrees 
of  commitment in ten US states. In most cases, it leads to the application of  
the law of  the place of  injury (injurious conduct or resulting injury),121 which 
118 See supra n 75.
119 Symeonides, supra n 81, 541–44.
120 Restatement Confl ict of  Laws (Second) § 145.
121 For a full analysis of  US jurisprudence on the law applicable to torts see SC Symeonides, 
“Choice of  Laws in Cross-Border Torts” (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328191, 65–66. 
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frequently coincides with the lex fori. US courts have many times discarded this 
rule in favour of  “interest analysis” approaches which are said to afford them 
more discretion and often lead them to apply forum law. For example, it is 
possible to read in US jurisprudence that “the United States has an overriding 
interest in applying its own laws to defendants, all of  whom are US companies” 
or that “foreign jurisdictions have no interest in applying their law to damages 
issues if  it would result in less protection to their nationals in a suit against a 
United States Corporation”, and that “New York law applies in cases in which 
the harm occurs abroad and where there is no confl ict with the law of  the 
foreign jurisdiction”.122 Nevertheless, it is also possible to read that US courts 
have no interest in applying US law with expressions such as “if  Taiwan will 
not provide a remedy to its own citizens, there is no reason for California to do 
so. . . . What interest has California in treating Taiwanese plaintiffs more gen-
erously than Taiwan treats them?”123 Particularly in the environmental fi eld, the 
interest analysis has been used in an inter-state US case where the lex fori (DC) 
had the “greatest interest” because, although the conduct occurred somewhere 
else (Maryland), the injuries and plaintiffs were placed there.124
In addition, the “effects” test has been increasingly used – especially by the 
circuit courts of  appeals – as a way to allow US courts to remedy transna-
tional harms. No longer limited to the antitrust or commercial contexts, courts 
apply all sorts of  public and private laws to activity occurring abroad. In the 
environmental fi eld, the Pakootas case is illustrative of  the application of  public 
laws. US authorities had requested certain controls to a trail smelter complex 
in Canada that was polluting the waters of  the Columbia River (fl owing from 
Canada to the US). An attempt was made to try to enforce these controls 
by a private civil action by US local tribes before a US court seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief  and civil damages. Despite the defendants having 
Canadian permits – whose US equivalents would have exempted liability – the 
US Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) was applied “extraterritorially”125 and, therefore, the claim for an 
From the analysed cases the study concludes that they are almost evenly split between apply-
ing the law of  the place of  the conduct and the law of  the place of  the injury.
 
122 Sykes, supra n 69, 33–34.
123 SC Symeonides, “Choice of  Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual 
Survey” (2011) 59 American Journal of  Comparative Law 303, 332–33, analysing Chang v Baxter 
Healthcare Corp, 599 F3d 728 (7th Cir 2010), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (26 April 2010), cert 
denied 131 SCt 322 (US 2010).
124 Nnadili v Chevron USA INC, 435 FSupp2d 93 (CDC 2006).
125 Pakootas v Teck Comico Metals, Ltd 59 ERC 1870 (ED Wash 2004). It is interesting to note that, 
though the District Court applied the effects doctrine and considered the extraterritorial appli-
cation of  CERCLA, the Ninth Circuit Court of  Appeals considered that the language of  
CERCLA, imposing the cleaning of  sites in the US, led to its domestic rather than extra-
territorial application. For a study of  the case, see GF Hess, “The Trail Smelter, the Columbia 
River and the Extraterritorial Application of  CERCLA” (2005) 18 Georgetown International Envi-
ronmental Law Review 24.
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injunction against a polluting activity in a foreign country was successful. As 
this case shows, the effects/“signifi cant nexus”126 has been used by courts even 
to apply internal administrative environmental laws. However, when it comes to 
deciding the applicable administrative law in US inter-state confl icts, the law of  
the source state – which resembles the EU mutual recognition principle refer-
ence to the lex originis – is the one applied.127
The practice of  resorting to the effects criterion has been deterred recently 
by the Supreme Court in Morrison.128 The case establishes a strong presumption 
against extraterritoriality – probably to confront the marked increase in inter national 
cases fi led in the US. In the securities fi eld, according to Morrison, courts should 
not presume that Congress intends to regulate the overseas conduct of  foreign-
ers in the absence of  clear and unmistakable evidence of  Congressional intent. 
Hence, the application of  US law, even as forum law, becomes a more delicate 
issue in torts that are suffered abroad. In this respect it has to be acknowledged 
that the Restatement of  Foreign Relations states that the US has the right to 
apply its own law not only to conduct or persons in its territory, but also to 
conduct outside its territory that has substantial effects in or is directed to the 
US and to the activities and status of  their nationals abroad.129 Moreover, it 
cannot be forgotten that in the US, most courts will refuse to consider foreign 
law if  the parties do not raise it or do not assist the court to ascertain its con-
tent, and, therefore lex fori would be applied.130
It may be concluded that in the US the wide tendency of  the courts to 
favour the application of  the lex fori131 – applicable often in practice if  parties 
do not contribute to the acknowledgement of  the content of  foreign law – 
seems to be showing a trend towards a more detailed and controlled analysis of  
its extraterritorial reach in recent tort actions. Certain US doctrine had already 
started to recommend a return to the lex loci delicti, which is anyhow included 
in the Restatement of  Confl ict of  Laws, be it through the reasoning permitted 
126 The signifi cant nexus test is used in the context of  the application of  the US Clean Water Act. 
On this test, see LR Liebesman, R Petersen and M Galano “Rapanos v United States: Search-
ing for a Signifi cant Nexus Using Proximate Causation and Foreseeability Principles” (2010) 40 
Environmental Law Reporter, News & Analysis 11242.
127 North Carolina, ex rel Cooper v Tennessee Valley Authority, 615 F3d 291 (4th Cir 2010). The Court 
established – following the pre-emption doctrine on the Supremacy Clause of  the US Con-
stitution (Art VI.2) – that an injunction against coal-fi red power plants in Tennessee pursued 
through a public nuisance action by the state of  North Carolina against the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, had to be denied because the laws of  Tennessee applied when determining whether 
the plants’ emissions constituted a public nuisance in North Carolina. For a note on this case, 
see www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124_north_carolina_v_TVA.pdf. 
128 Morrison v National Australia Bank, No 08-1191 (US 6/24/10). See a comment by Symeonides, 
supra n 123 (2011).
129 See supra n 60.
130 For recent practice on the proof  of  foreign law, see Symeonides, supra n 123, 98-101.
131 Symeonides, supra n 121, 65–66, concludes that 65% of  the 105 analysed cases were resolved 
by applying forum law, whilst if  the lex loci delicti rule had been used by all the courts, the lex 
fori would have been applied only in 57% of  them.
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by the “interest analysis” doctrine or the “most signifi cant relationship” test.132 
In this respect it has also been noted that up to recent times, despite using dif-
ferent approaches and invoking varied rationales, courts have mostly applied 
the law that better favoured the victims of  the torts.133
E. CONCLUSION
The coexistence of  international agreements and EU law on civil liability for 
environmental claims has not prevented increased litigation in this fi eld in the 
EU that may eventually be augmented slightly more with the introduction of  
the forum necessitatis rule in the Brussels I Regulation. This rule would establish 
jurisdiction if  no other forum guarantees the right to a fair trial – or recogni-
tion of  a foreign decision – and the dispute has a suffi cient connection with a 
Member State. This has occurred despite the complexity of  the determination 
of  the applicable law in the EU. The determination of  the applicable law in 
procedures before EU Member States’ courts will often lead to the fragmen-
tation of  the civil liability of  the perpetrator of  an environmental harm and 
to the application of  a combination of  the substantive norms of  international 
agreements and a number of  national laws.
This occurs at a time when the already complex determination of  jurisdic-
tion in the US is showing a restrictive trend. Forum non conveniens motions are 
being accepted, often after a long and costly judicial procedure. In addition, the 
not unusual application of  forum law by US courts – which can be considered 
benefi cial since, at the least, the US is not subject to environmental conven-
tions limiting responsibility – is also showing a trend towards a more detailed 
and controlled analysis of  the extraterritorial reach of  national laws which, no 
doubt, affects the predictability of  their application.
Hence, despite its complexities, it may seem more attractive nowadays to liti-
gate in the EU. Nevertheless, practice also shows that these cases, on one side 
of  the Atlantic or on the other, tend to end up with settlements, and, as the 
saying goes, a bad settlement is always better than a good trial.
132 Sykes, supra n 69, 34–35.
133 Symeonides, supra n 121, 65–66 concludes that 90% of  the analysed cases applied the law that 
favoured the plaintiff; whilst if  the lex loci delicti rule had been used by all the courts, the per-
centage would have been reduced to 54%.
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APPENDIX
Convention EU US
Convention on Civil Liabil-
ity for Damage Resulting 
from Activities Dangerous to 
the Environment (Lugano, 
21/6/1993)
Not in force
Greece, Cyprus, Finland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal (signed)
International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (CLC Brussels, 1969) 
– London Protocols 1976 and 
1992, amended in 2000
In force 1975
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta; Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania; Spain, Sweden, UK, 
(all 76 and 92; except for Ireland, Malta, 
Romania and UK only 92)
Protocol on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage 
Resulting from Transbound-
ary Movements of  Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal 
(Basle Protocol, 1989)
In force 1992
Amendment 1999 and Ban 
Amendment, July 2010
Not in force
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, EU, Finland, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
US (signed)
Convention on Liability for 
bunker oil pollution damage 
(London 2001)
In force, November 2008
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Nether-
lands, Poland, Romania, Spain
International Convention on 
Liability and Compensation 
for Damage in Connection 
with the Carriage of  Hazard-
ous and Noxious Substances 
by Sea (HNS London, 1996)
Not in force
September 2010 Protocol – not 
in force
Lithuania – ratifi ed
EU Council decision (2002/971/EC) 
requiring all European Union Member 
States to take the necessary steps to 
ratify within a reasonable time period, if  
possible, before 30 June 2006
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Protocol on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Damage 
Caused by the Transboundary 
Effects of  Industrial Accidents 
on Transboundary Waters to 
the 1992 Convention on the 
Protection and Use of  Trans-
boundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes and to 
the 1992 Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of  
Industrial Accidents. (Kiev, 21 
May 2003)
Not in force
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Sweden, UK (signatories)
Convention on third party lia-
bility in the fi eld of  nuclear 
energy (Paris 1960), sup-
plemented by the Brussels 
Convention 31 January 63; 
harmonised with the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability 
for nuclear damage 1963.
In force 1977
and Vienna Protocol 1997
In force 2003
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Spain
UK (only signed)
Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy & Lithua-
nia (signed), Poland & Romania (in force)
UK (signed)
Convention relating to civil lia-
bility in the fi eld of  maritime 
carriage of  nuclear material, 
(Brussels, 1971)
In force 1975
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden
Convention on the Limitation 
of  liability for maritime claims 
(LLMC, London, 1976 and 
1996)
In force 1986 and 2004
Belgium (96), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark 
(96), Finland (96) France, Germany (96), 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland (76), Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands (96), Poland 
(76), Spain (96), Sweden (96), UK (96)
International Convention 
relating to the Limitation of  
the Liability of  Owners of  
Sea-Going Ships (Brussels, 
1957), Protocol 1979
In force 1968 and 1984
Portugal, UK
